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The editors have asked for an Essay, a sort of travelogue of the
distance between Austin and Oklahoma City, home and away, sanity and
madness, hope and despair. They hinted vaguely that I might want to
answer criticisms of my representing Terry Lynn Nichols. I am not
responding to those hints, because I do not need to, at least not in a
publication by and for lawyers. I was appointed by the court. Almost
everyone I meet has been warm, supportive, and understanding. The man
who ably keeps my boots repaired told me last week that he well under-
stood what I was doing. "If people who get arrested did not have lawyers,
then anybody the police suspect would be railroaded off to jail. It would
be a police state."
By similar token, you will not find much in this Essay about the
"facts" of the Oklahoma City tragedy. Trials are the place for evidence.
The media, even a law review, is not the place for me to try this lawsuit.
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translation from page 14 of the French original. The Kamuf translation of the Derrida passage I am
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The reader will, however, detect some passion and even anger in the
words below. To accept a great challenge requires, at least for me, a
passionate commitment to fulfill it. In litigation as in love, technical
proficiency without passion is not wholly satisfying.
The call came on Thursday, May 11, 1995. I had spent the day
talking about appellate practice at the Thurgood Marshall Building in
Washington, D.C. The audience members were federal public defenders,
who do a difficult job with too little recognition, working every day to see
that the line between the state and human liberty is drawn fairly.
Chief Judge David L. Russell of the Western District of Oklahoma had
called my home. My eleven-year-old daughter took the message. When
I checked in from Washington National Airport, my daughter said I should
call the judge.
Chief Judge Russell and former Chief Judge Lee West (before whom
I had appeared some years ago) said they wanted to appoint me to
represent Terry Lynn Nichols, the forty-year-old father of two who was
being held as an accomplice in the April 19, 1995, Oklahoma City
bombing.
I confess I had not followed the details in the media. I knew the
government did not claim that Mr. Nichols was present in Oklahoma City
on that day. I also knew that the case had been characterized as capital by
the Attorney General and the President.
Judge Russell said he first had the idea of appointing me when he
remembered a videotape of a mock closing argument in a capital case that
I had done as part of the Smithsonian's annual Folk-Life Festival in
Washington, D.C. nearly a decade ago. He said he had checked me out
with lawyers and judges, mentioning Judge Patrick Higginbotham of the
Fifth Circuit by name.
When a judge tenders an appointment in a criminal case, only the most
compelling reasons should make a lawyer try to avoid the assignment. We
daily proclaim our commitment to the adversary system. While we have
the right to pick and choose among clients who come to our doors, the
indigent defendant facing death at the state's hands has a powerful claim
on us. Were it not so, our protestations about the adversary system would
crumble into hypocrisy and cynicism.
Judge Russell's story of how my name came to mind is probably
incomplete. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts has statutory
responsibility for advising judges on appointments in federal capital cases,
and that office has said that there was a "short list" of advocates being
considered for appointment. Some lawyers had gone on national television
to say they would not take such an appointment.
The charges against Mr. Nichols might make this a capital case.
Hence, he is entitled to at least two experienced lead counsel. I was lucky
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that Ronald G. Woods, a University of Texas graduate with thirty years'
experience as prosecutor and defense counsel, agreed to accept appointment
along with me. Ron Woods has seen law practice as few lawyers have.
He was an FBI agent, an assistant district attorney, an assistant United
States Attorney, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
Texas, and a lawyer in private practice. I have opposed him when he was
in government service, and worked with him during his time in private
practice.
During my eleven years at the University of Texas, I have been
counsel in many challenging pro bono and appointed cases. Law students
have worked alongside me, with the consent of the dean, and have received
course credit for their work. Using pro bono cases as a learning ground
for students may be reason enough to accept such responsibility. In
addition, the law professor's obligation of public service demands some
form of contribution to the community.
There is more. I remain a defender because I am dismayed and
angered by what I see around me, and I think that as a lawyer the only way
through the present terrible time is to fashion and refashion a certain image
of justice.
I am not speaking now of the tragedy of April 19, 1995. I am visited
every day with the sense of loss felt by all the people of Oklahoma, which
is one reason I think it unfair and unreasonable to ask them to pass
dispassionate judgment on those events. Nor am I conjuring up the image
of the President and the Attorney General rushing before the television
cameras to call for the death penalty, as though no fact that could ever be
found would stand in the way of deliberately taking another life as a means
of doing justice for the ones already lost.
I am not talking of the storm of publicity, nor of a sense that this is
a "historic" case. Every lawyer in the Oklahoma City case knows that our
work will be judged, now and in time to be. It is important not to be self-
conscious about that knowledge. None of us can make a bargain with
history, saying, "Well, if I act in this way, can I guarantee that I will be
regarded in a certain way twenty years hence?" We can only do the next
right thing as best we see it. History, the past and the present, informs us,
teaches us. History yet to be written cannot turn us from our honestly
determined duty.
In deciding to act, one steps into a space between past and future.
The past-the suffering and tragedy-are established events, to be under-
stood as well as one can. Stepping into the moment now is a search for
something called justice. Justice or injustice, in the now and in the future,
is part of a process. The past events cannot be unraveled or undone, but
one can perhaps prevent people's attitudes towards those events from
becoming an excuse for injustice.
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I am talking of a prosaic, down-to-earth notion of justice. Something
like Camus was describing when he said that our chance of salvation is to
strive for justice, which is something that only the human species has
devised. Justice, as Camus also reminded us, must be more than an ab-
stract idea; it must be a reflection of compassion for one's fellow beings.
In the name of Justice, the abstract idea writ large, great wrongs have been
done. Jordan and Carol Steiker have given us a compelling essay about a
death row inmate weighted down by abstract and yet inhuman justice. The
inmate, Karla Faye Tucker, had a T-shirt that said, "Kill them all. God
will sort them out." This is one version of a cry attributed to the Papal
Legate who presided over the massacre of some 15,000 men, women, and
children at Beziers, near Marseille, in 1209. It seemed that some of these
people had been adjudged (and there is the word again-derived from the
same root as justice itself yet separate from it in its essence) heretics.
Today, and close by, legislators are busy terminating and trimming
programs of legal assistance for the poor. The most visible casualties are
the Resource Centers that have valiantly struggled to represent-and to help
volunteer lawyers represent-defendants charged with and convicted of
capital crimes. The most despised, the most endangered defendants may
be without counsel. Yet their cases, as history teaches us without any
reason for doubt, are the ones most likely to have excited governmental
passion in ways that make judgment fallible.
Do you doubt this statement about fallible judgment? Consider the
Haymarket trial, in which innocent men were railroaded, and only those
who escaped the noose could be pardoned years later. Sacco and Vanzetti
were swept up in the xenophobic hysteria fomented by the federal govern-
ment, most visibly in the person of Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer.
More recently, a Cleveland auto worker spent years in a death cell con-
victed of being Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka; not only was he innocent of
that charge, but our own government had defrauded the federal courts to
get him extradited to Israel for trial.
In each of these cases, there were victims of crime. It was no honor
to them, nor proper solace to those who mourned them, that their deaths
became an excuse for crimes committed in the name of the state-in the
name of justice.
Yet, in cases like these that may arise in the future, and that are now
pending, there are not to be lawyers, unless something is done very
quickly.
This is not to speak of the civil claims of people who simply want
access to the justice system to present or protect their theoretically valid
rights. These folks are to lose many of the lawyers provided by legal
services offices.
In Alabama, the newspaper reports, the chain gang is back. There is
no social need for it. The state gets all the gravel for its roads from
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commercial quarries. But rocks are being shipped at state expense to
prisons, so that men in prison can be chained together and break the rocks
into smaller rocks. Nobody has any proof that this degradation of humans
deters anyone from crime, and there is no hint that the rock-breakers
acquire a skill or do some useful labor.
Alabama's atavistic adventure is simply one example in a growing list
of savageries committed in the name of justice. In 1993, 2.9 times as
many people were behind bars in America as in 1980. The prison popula-
tion continues to increase; sentences are longer. Yet the proportion of
violent offenders among the prison population declines, telling us that
prison is becoming the remedy of choice for nonviolent crime. The statis-
tics become grimmer in the inner cities, where incarceration rates for
African-American males are multiples of the already high national average.
In the United States, we incarcerate a far higher percentage of the
population than any country in the world, and that includes the former
Soviet Union and pre-democracy South Africa.
I doubt many people feel safer knowing that prison sentences are
longer and more readily handed out. To say this is not to endorse a vague
commitment to finding the "social causes of crime" and doing nothing until
we make the discovery. The drive for ever-sterner sentences handed out
in proceedings where defendants have ever-fewer rights is simply an
abandonment of rational discourse. The political success of such proposals
is partly due to a gap in criminological theory. Criminologists try to tell
us why people commit crimes and to describe the patterns of criminal
behavior. They have had little to say about how to make people safe from
criminal behavior.
It is possible to accommodate the perceived need for public safety with
the dignity of all persons, but doing so will require a rational search based
upon familiar values. That is, indeed, one of the most important tasks now
facing us.
To look beyond our shores, we must all share a sense of horror at the
waves of ethnic violence-and the incipient pogroms-that wash over
nations on several continents. These tortures and murders are being
inflicted by groups possessing state power, and therefore claiming a
legitimate monopoly on the instruments of violence. The perpetrators are
pleased to call what they are doing "justice."
For me, the question is "What personal responsibility do I, as one
trained in the law, living the law, have right now?" Responsibility from
where, from whom? Responsibility how determined? Responsibility to
whom? When one says responsibility, one inevitably summons up some
"other" or "others," present and not present, from the past, and in some
time to come. One summons up a dialectical image of process. This sense
of the other, the not-present, is eloquently evoked by Jacques Derrida in
his series of lectures published as Spectres de Marx.
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Derrida moves from considering continuity to confront the idea of
justice. Just now, I used the term "justice system." That is a mistake. It
is the system-called-justice. It is called-justice in the same sense that the
Papal Legate was sent to Beziers to dispense "justice." The "system" is
an abstraction, a machine for putting a name, the name "justice" or
"judgment," on results. The "system" is not "justice" because the system
makes "justice" into an abstraction. When I say "justice" I do not mean
a name-giver. I mean what Camus meant-an idea that unites uniquely
human values based upon compassion.
When I speak of a prosaic and down-to-earth idea of justice, I mean
simply that one can deduce principles of right from human needs in the
present time. That is, I reject the cynical, or Stoic, or no-ought-from-an-is
idea that one set of rules is just as good as another. I reject the notion, as
Professor Martha Nussbaum has characterized it, "that to every argument
some argument to a contradictory conclusion can be opposed; that argu-
ments are in any case merely tools of influence, without any better sort of
claim to our allegiance." Rather, again borrowing from Professor
Nussbaum, my notions of justice "include a commitment, open-ended and
revisable because grounded upon dialectical arguments that have their roots
in experience, to a definite view of human flourishing and good human
functioning." One element of such views is that "human beings have needs
for things in the world: for political rights, for money and food and
shelter, for respect and self-respect," and so on.
By hewing to a basic definition of justice, I mean to confess a certain
hesitation, perhaps humility. In times as turbulent as these, with opinions
swinging widely and violently from side to side, I want to return to the
most basic skills and values I know and possess. I want to live my lawyer-
life in the search for, and fidelity to, this "justice" as I understand it.
I will try to derive truths from the past and present, and from a sense
of responsibility to those who will come after, but I am making decisions
for myself and not as an apostle of others or with a claim to lead. If the
ideas appeal to you, there is plenty of work to do and all are welcome.
The sense of hesitation, and of personal quest, is also evoked by
Derrida in his lectures. He begins with a translated passage from the first
act of Hamlet. Hamlet sees the spirit of his father, and learns how and
why his father was murdered. "The time is out of joint," Hamlet says, "0
cursed spite, That ever I was born to set it right!"
Derrida conjures with the spirit, and with various translations, of this
passage to show us that thinking of justice drops us into the stream of
history, the flow from past to future. In the past are the events that put
time "off its hinges," or that "turn the world upside down." But to say
that things are "wrong" implies that from that same past there is some idea
of how things are "right-side up," or "on their hinges." This past-given
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sense, which is encompassed in an ideology that we can study and know,
is not simply about carpentry or gravity. It is about subjective but
verifiable principles of human flourishing.
And then in the present is our action, which tends into the future,
towards the "set it right." To make a personal commitment to that path is
not to pretend to be Prince of Denmark., It is simply to have understood
the text in a certain way, and to have drawn from it certain lessons-as
well as certain warnings about excessive or obsessive commitment.
This last observation is important. If the time is out of joint, the
remedy is surely not to swing off one's own hinges, to become
"unhinged." "And what if excessive love bewildered them till they died,"
Yeats wrote of the Easter martyrs, and again warned us that "Too long a
sacrifice can make a stone of the heart." But the dangers are not, for me,
a reason not to step into the stream.
So to return to the theme, the system-called-justice dispenses
"judgments" that bear the name "law" or "right"-in French "ioi" and
"droit." But the term "droit" or "right" rarely goes out alone. Sometimes
it is modified with an eye to justice, as in "human rights" ("droits de
l'homme"). More often, it is qualified (and particularly in French) by
words that give it an arid and abstract quality, like "civil right" as
something the "law" recognizes, or "droit criminel" as the French would
say "criminal law" and refer by those words to the system of penal rules
enforced by the state. So we do best by sticking to a certain, more basic
and yet more ample, sense of the term "justice."
As law students, we studied the branches of the common-law system:
contracts, torts, property, criminal law, civil procedure, constitutional law,
and whatever else our law schools required. What branches of learning did
you find at Harvard, Emerson said to Thoreau, who replied, All of the
branches and none of the roots.
We had our chance to study the roots. Most of us did so, and from
that study can come an informed judgment that the time is out of joint.
Our study, and our passports to the places where the system-called-justice
does its judging, adjudges, gives judgments, give us unique access. I will
not say our study and our passports give us a responsibility. We must each
figure that one out for ourselves.
For me, I will take my knowledge and my passport and try to
advocate, in the places I am admitted, for just principles and just results.
I will remember that I am lucky enough to be "admitted" to classrooms
and lecture halls and street corners and byways and law journals and
newspapers, as well as to places where more formal advocacy is done in
the system-called-justice.
In making this decision, I am borne up by the example of my friends.
Dullah Omar, a lawyer in South Africa, struggled for so many years
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against apartheid generally and for Nelson Mandela's release specifically.
He came to be Minister of Justice in the new South Africa. His struggle,
and his decisions in it, were the product of experience, the result of
stepping into the stream and not of standing beside it lost in thought.
If I see the time is out of joint, and want to help "set it right," how
shall I decide to use my energy in this, the sixth decade of my life? I am
not alone on the path, so I must protect the well-being of my family in
whatever I do.
Beyond that, I take my knowledge and passport to places I think I am
best suited to be, not as compared to anybody else but only to how well or
not-well I would do in other places where I might be.
Today, the system-called-justice poses its greatest threat to justice
properly-so-called in the criminal-law system. Criminal trials, particularly
famous ones, are intended to be didactic. That is, the state uses the
criminal system-called-justice not only to take away liberty and life, but to
announce and enforce social priorities.
Taking lawyers away from people sentenced to death announces a
priority-to kill inmates without ceremony, in a way that says that poor
people's claims of innocence, claims for justice, are not important.
In the Oklahoma City cases, we have already witnessed some an-
nouncements of priorities. Custodial interrogations of the defendant and
his family were done without semblance of process or legality. Govern-
ment agents felt free to leak theories of the defendant's complicity, only to
leak contradictory stories a few days later. It seemed that many people in
government had decided that the stakes were high enough that the rules
didn't matter.
I have seen this arrogance of power before. A federal judge asked me
in oral argument why the government would commit the frauds I had
alleged in an effort to condemn John Demjanjuk for a crime he did not
commit. I recalled simply the rhetorical excess in which the entire
government case had come to be enfolded, and summoned up Ruskin's
words that there is no snare set by the fiend for the mind of man more
dangerous than the illusion that our enemies are also the enemies of god.
To spare a life that might be wrongly taken, or shelter a freedom that
might be wrongly abridged, is already a significant participatory act. One
must bring to bear the sense of justice, and'the skills learned because one
is an advocate.
There is more to it. The state sees its system-called-justice as
didactic, and arranges matters in the service of that goal. When the system
delivers someone from the state's power, the lesson taught is not the one
intended, but is a lesson nonetheless. Because the initial decision to make
the system-called-justice didactic in a particular way is the state's to begin
with, these deliverances have a significance all out of proportion to their
[Vol. 74:101
Defending
number. The opportunity to weigh in that balance is an additional benefit
of participating.
When the colonial newspaper editor John Peter Zenger was charged
with seditious libel, no doubt colonial Governor Cosby thought to teach
Zenger, his cohorts, and his supporters all a lesson. When the tables were
turned, and Zenger acquitted, a far greater and longer lasting lesson was
taught. When George IV sought to rid himself of his wife, Queen
Caroline, by charging her with adultery in the House of Lords, her
vindication had more force than the opposite result could ever have had.
When a South Carolina jury refused to condemn Susan Smith to death
for killing her children, its members were expressing a community senti-
ment about justice, and their verdict sounded out louder than a plea-
bargained life sentence would have.
These lessons-unintended from the state's perspective-redeem, re-
fine, and announce justice and reaffirm the human commitment to it.
These reaffirmations in turn help to validate norms and principles of
justice, in commands and procedures. The time is out of joint, swinging
on its hinges, turned upside down, dishonored; the dominant theme in
every reading of Hamlet's cry is flux, change, uncertainty. "The time,"
the good old boy would say, "is like a hog on ice." In such a time, an
image of justice-of which the human species is the only one to conceive-
and of participation in a process fixed between the no-longer-there and the
yet-to-be, is a guide to behavior. The option of doing nothing, a "kind of
silence about injustice," as Brecht said it, is itself a participation.
So I participate because I have an inkling, and am given a means to
validate it step by step.
In telling about stepping into the stream between past and future, I
make clear why I part company with those who criticize my representation
of this or that person. I owe those detractors no duty of explanation. My
private reasonings are mine to share or not as I should wish. By focusing
on some purported obligation of personal justification, these misguided
souls are missing the entire point of the journey. I am not trying to set an
example. I am trying to understand how to live my life. Je voudrais
apprendre & vivre enfin.
I can say I am not trying to set an example. I realize that by making
some public expression-for the lawyer as for the artist-one is condemned
to signify. Neither the artist nor the advocate can plausibly claim to be
tracing figures on the inside walls of his mind, for his own delectation.
But in a time out of joint, the surest signifying is done in a context
provided by events. For the advocate, the event is a cry for justice, not
usually spectral but from a flesh and blood human being.
I know, of course, that the rigged didactic of the criminal trial has
false elements. In the courtroom arena, there is a symbolic equality of
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defense and prosecution. We understand that in fact the balance of
resources almost always tips in favor of the government, and this is
particularly so in high-profile cases where high officials have announced
an intention to take the defendants' lives. The defendant is not given a
choice whether to participate in the unequal contest. The inequality is just
another device of the system-called-justice. The lawyer's job is to expose
the device, deploying the signs of justice against the signs of system-called-
justice. The signs of justice include empowering the jury, calling on the
tribunal to respect its oath, exposing contradiction-bringing out solid
reasons why the judge and jurors should go beneath the surface of things.
About 90 % of criminal cases are disposed of on pleas of guilty, so the
10% of cases that are tried bear all the semiotic weight. The trial-court
struggle over what will be taught covers the entire range of symbols. On
one side, we see the government's reassuring sense of power and
knowledge, of things as they should be, that we will be safer if another
creature is jailed or put to death. On the defense side, the symbols are of
individual responsibility for results; the image is one of courageous
individuals standing up to superior force and using their intellect, power,
and insight.
Maybe when time is rejointed, back on its hinges, right-side up, we
will see more equal struggles over liberty. I can hope so.
My purpose in Oklahoma, and in whatever venue to which the case
is moved, is not to justify myself. That would be an arrogant, foolish,
pointless act. I am and will be there to try and see that the system-called-
justice respects and renders justice properly-so-called. I am there to see
that done for a fellow creature whose life I am to shelter.
Where am I then? To borrow again from Derrida, Oit suis-je enfin?
Where am I finally? Not "finally" in the sense of an end, but of a
moment between past and future, and about to push ahead again like
feeling one's way forward in the dark. Oft a mountain road in the coal
black night, C.S. Lewis wrote, we would give far more for a glimpse of
the few feet ahead than for a vision of some distant horizon.
I am in that moment that has fascinated writers for centuries. The
place between. "Your sons and daughters shall prophesy, your old ...
shall dream dreams, your young ... shall see visions." I am old enough
to be the dreamer evoked by this passage from Joel 2:28. My dreams are
of things recollected, which I flatter myself to call old truths and insights.
The visions and prophesies are of the future, where those who will live
there longer than I will reap the harvest of this moment in time.
